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Abstract 
In the past twenty years, India’s economy has grown at increasingly faster rates and 
now belongs to the fastest-growing economies in the world. One would think that in 
such economic conditions, women are increasingly being pulled into the labour force 
by attractive pay and employment conditions. This paper examines trends and drivers 
of female labour force participation in urban India between 1987 and 2004; we do this 
using aggregate and unit level data and estimate econometric participation models. Our 
paper shows a much more nuanced picture than one might expect. While we find, as 
expected,  that  cultural  and  social  factors  strongly  influence  female  labour  force 
participation rates, among the somewhat unexpected findings are: 
  Only in the period between 1999 and 2004 did female labour force participation rates 
increase  in  urban  areas;  before,  rates  remained  flat  due  to  offsetting  trends  of 
increases among some groups and decreases among others; 
  Our results suggest that at lower levels of education, increases in female labour force 
participation are driven more by distress than by increasing economic opportunities;  
  Only at the  highest education  levels do we see evidence of pull factors drawing 
women  into  the  labour  force  at  attractive  employment  and  pay  conditions;  this 
affects, by 2004, only a small minority of India’s women. 
As a result, the economic boom has offered remarkably few opportunities to women in 
India.  In  fact,  for  all  but the  very  well-educated,  it  appears that the  labour market 
conditions have not improved at all, or even deteriorated.   2
1. Introduction 
While India’s economic growth has increased over the past two decades and future 
predictions are optimistic, female labour force participation was stagnant for a long 
time and started to rise only at the turn of the century. Given the positive effect female 
participation can have on economic growth (Esteve-Volart, 2004; Klasen and Lamanna, 
2009), drawing women into the labor force can be an important source of future growth 
of  the  Indian  economy.  This  is  particularly the case  as  higher  female participation 
would allow India to reap more benefits of its currently advantageous age structure of 
the population with a large share of working age people and relatively few dependents: 
this favourable demographic constellation (a result of prior fertility decline) has been 
referred to as the  demographic dividend. Demographic dividend, coupled with high 
female participation rates, is alleged to have accounted for about a third of East Asia’s 
high  per  capita  growth  rates  (Bloom  and  Williamson,  1998).  Beyond  economic 
benefits, women’s participation in the labour force can be seen as a signal of declining 
discrimination and increasing empowerment of women (Mammen and Paxson, 2000). 
However, feminization of the workforce is not necessarily a sign of improvement. It 
can also be a response to recession and increasing  insecurity  in the  labour market, 
functioning  essentially  as  an  insurance  mechanism  for  households  (Standing,  1999; 
Bhalotra and Umaña-Aponte, 2010).  
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  determine  what  drives  the  labour  force  participation 
behaviour of women in urban India.
1 Table 1 summarizes the urban female employment 
figures for the period 1983-2005. The increase in female labour force participation rate 
in the period 1999 to 2004 came about after stagnation between 1983 and 1999. In 
absolute terms, more than five million women entered the urban labour force in the last 
period,with  significant  numbers  entering  self-employment, regular employment, and 
unemployment.
2  
Understanding the determinants of women’s participation is necessary to be able to 
understand the implications for women’s wellbeing and for future growth of the labour 
                                                 
1 The employment structure differs substantially between rural and urban areas, with rural women 
predominantly in self-employment and casual work, while urban women work mostly as regular 
employees. It is therefore likely that the determinants of women’s participation differ between rural and 
urban areas. In the present paper we focus on urban women, and leave the analysis of rural female labour 
force participation for future research. 
2 Part of the increase in the number of working women reflects the share of women aged 20-59 in the 
total female population, which has increased from 46 to 54 per cent since 1983. Clearly, demographic 
changes have also contributed to workforce growth, augmenting the recent jump in participation rates.   3
force and the economy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of female 
labour  force  participation  in  India  that  includes  the  period  1999-2004  and 
systematically  analyses  different  possible  explanations  offered  in  the  literature. 
Furthermore, we pay special attention to the differences between poorly and highly 
educated  women,  which  appears  as  a  highly  relevant  distinction  in  the  context  of 
India’s economic development. 
 
Table 1 – Urban female population age 20-59  
  1983  1987-88  1993-94  1999-2000  2004-05 
Self-employed  2649   (7)  3249   (7)  3948   (7)  4745   (7)  6675   (8) 
Regular  2641   (7)  3347   (8)  4311   (8)  5364   (8)   7651 (10) 
Casual  2193   (6)  2225   (5)  3000   (5)  2968   (4)  2953   (4) 
Unemployed  530   (1)  785   (2)  976   (2)  909   (1)  1729   (2) 
Labour force  8013 (22)  9605 (22)  12235 (22)  13985 (21)  19007 (24) 
Other  29034 (78)  34715 (78)  43537 (78)  53308 (79)  61016 (76) 
Total  37047(100)  44325(100)  55766(100)  67300(100)  80031(100) 
Note: totals may not add up due to rounding. Numbers are in ‘000s, percentage of total in parentheses. 
Self-employed includes unpaid family workers, but excludes domestic duties. Regular employees receive 
salary or wages on a regular basis. Casual workers receive a wage according to the terms of the daily or 
periodic work contract. Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey and Sundaram (2007).  
 
We find that a closer look at India’s economic development suggests that the recent rise 
in women’s participation is driven by necessity rather than increased opportunities, at 
least for poorly educated women. An increasing share of workers is self-employed, and 
between 1999 and 2004 real earnings for men and women actually declined. The share 
of working women in agriculture and manufacturing self-employment and in domestic 
services increased, which are often poorly paying and highly insecure jobs. With higher 
education, women are more likely to work in better paying and more attractive jobs in 
the  services  sector. A unit  level analysis  sheds further light on the determinants of 
participation in paid employment. Our results show that women’s decision to work is 
affected by social and cultural factors and by the income and underemployment of 
household  members.  An  important  finding  is  that  only  highly  educated  women  are 
attracted to the labour market by higher expected earnings: for women with less than 
secondary education we find a negative effect of market wages on participation in paid 
employment.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarizes related literature 
on development and women’s labour force participation and previous studies on India. 
In Section 3, the changes in employment and earnings in India during the recent past 
are described in more detail. Section 4  presents an empirical model and estimation   4
results for women’s participation in paid employment. Finally, Section 5 summarizes 
the main findings and conclusions. 
 
2. Determinants of female labour force participation 
The basic static labour supply model is a starting point for many models of female 
labour  force  participation  (e.g.  Blundell  and  MaCurdy,  1999).  In  the  static  labour 
supply model, an individual derives utility from income and from leisure. Leisure is the 
time  left  after  working  hours  are  deducted  from  total  time  available,  and  the 
opportunity cost of leisure is equal to the wage rate.  For a given  income level, an 
increase in the wage rate reduces demand for leisure as its opportunity cost rises, and 
labour  supply  will  increase.  If  leisure  is  a  normal  good,  an  increase  in  a  person’s 
income will increase the demand for leisure and thus reduce her hours worked. These 
are the well-known substitution and income effects.  
For a person with positive labour supply (i.e., who currently works for pay), an increase 
in the wage rate has both a positive substitution effect and a negative income effect, 
since income is partly derived from working for pay such that higher wages translate 
into higher income. The overall effect on labour supply depends on the relative strength 
of the substitution and income effect, and is theoretically ambivalent. For a person not 
working, and increase in the wage rate only has a substitution effect, increasing the 
incentive  to  work.  Besides  the  own  wage,  income  consists  of  so-called  unearned 
income, which includes wage income of other household members and income from 
non-labour sources. An increase in unearned income reduces labour supply through a 
negative income effect.  In the case of married women, a particularly important aspect 
of this unearned income is the earnings of the husband. 
 
2.1. Development and women’s participation  
Beyond the basic labour supply model, several ideas have developed in the analysis of 
female  labour force participation in  developing  countries.  Probably  the best known 
hypothesis in this literature is the “feminization U”: female labour force participation 
first declines and then increases as an economy develops (Goldin, 1994; Mammen and 
Paxson, 2000). In initial stages of development, education levels rise and employment 
shifts from agriculture to manufacturing. But in these initial stages, men’s education 
levels rise faster than women’s and the new manufacturing jobs available are, unlike 
farm work, incompatible with domestic duties and existing social stigmas about women   5
moving about independently  in public. Combined with the negative effect of rising 
income  of  male  family  members,  female  participation  declines.  Once  women’s 
education level rises and demand for white-collar workers increases with the expansion 
of the services sector, higher wages and socially acceptable types of work lead to higher 
female labour force participation. Though the feminization U is sometimes considered a 
stylized fact, the empirical evidence in support of it is mostly based on cross-country 
analysis, while  panel analyses have produced mixed results (e.g., Çagatay and Özler, 
1995; Gaddis and Klasen, 2011). But one might well hypothesize that within a country, 
there is a U-shape relationship between economic or educational status and women’s 
labor force participation rates. Among the poorly educated, women are forced to work 
to  survive  and  among  the  very  highly  educated,  stigmas  militating  again  female 
employment  may  be  low.  Between  these  two  groups,  women  may  face  barriers  to 
labour  force  participation  related  to both  the  absence  of  an  urgent  need  of  female 
employment, and the presence of social stigmas associated with female employment 
(see below). This would be consistent with a similar U-shape relationship in gender 
bias  in  mortality  by education  or  income  groups,  where  gender bias appears  to be 
largest among the middle groups (e.g. Klasen and Wink, 2003; Dreze and Sen, 2002). 
In any case, the feminization U (at the country or international level) reflects several 
underlying  forces  at  work,  and  we  aim  to  analyse  these  issues  separately,  thereby 
contributing to this debate using disaggregated analysis. 
Standing (1999) argues that growing labour market  flexibility and diverse  forms of 
insecurity have encouraged greater female labour force participation around the world. 
Technological change and increasing international competition stimulate employers to 
focus  on a  limited  number of permanent core  workers,  while  making  more  use  of 
temporary workers and subcontracting. Through an increase in income and employment 
insecurity  and  women’s  greater  willingness  to  work  in  insecure  employment 
relationships, women are induced to work: rising female labour force participation thus 
reflects the erosion of men’s position in the labour market, rather than an improvement 
in women’s opportunities.  
This view incorporates the theory of women’s labour supply as insurance mechanism 
for households (Attanasio et al., 2005). In a recent paper, Bhalotra and Umaña-Aponte 
(2010) show that in developing countries in Asia and Latin America, female labour 
force participation rates move counter-cyclically: women move from non-employment 
into paid and self-employment during recessions. In line with theory, they also find that   6
counter-cyclicality  is  strongest  in  households  with  limited  alternative  sources  of 
insurance against income shocks. 
The role of women as caregivers and housekeepers is obviously also important when it 
comes to the participation decision, as this determines their value within the household. 
Cunningham (2001) shows that in Mexico, unmarried women without children are as 
likely to work as men, while labour supply of married women depends on the presence 
of young children and the level and stability of household income. Gong and Van Soest 
(2002) show, also for Mexico, that the presence of another female increases labour 
supply  of  mothers  with  young  children.  With  declining  fertility,  one  would  expect 
female labour force participation rates to rise.
3 
Apart from such economic considerations, attitudes are also likely to play a role. Goldin 
(1994) describes the social stigma against women’s participation in industrial activity, 
which causes a decline in participation as an economy industrializes. Attitudes of both 
men  and  women  towards  gender  roles  can  be  shaped  by  factors  such  as  religion 
(Lehrer, 1995; Amin and Alam, 2008), education, mass communication, and attitudes 
and behaviour of previous generations (e.g., Farré and Vella, 2007).  
The different views discussed here are not mutually exclusive, and can be summarized 
in terms of the following determinants of women’s participation: 
-  The woman’s expected market wage, positively affecting participation. 
-  Unearned income, including income from other sources and other household 
members, which has a negative effect; 
-  Income  and  employment  insecurity  of  other  household  members  inducing 
higher participation;  
-  Social stigma, possibly related to (husband’s) education and the type of work (at 
home or outside, manual or non-manual work), which could depress female 
employment; 
-  Large family size as well household workload which could also depress female 
employment; 
All  of  these,  except  the  expected  market  wage,  are  determinants  of  the  so-called 
reservation  wage,  which  can  be  thought  of  as  the  marginal  utility  of  non-work 
                                                 
3 This need not necessarily be the case, however.  As shown by Priebe (2011) in the case of Indonesia, 
declining fertility might actually reduce female labor force participation rates among poorer parts of the 
population where fertility decline reduces the need to work.     7
(including  childcare  and  housework):  when  the  expected  market  wage  exceeds  the 
reservation wage, a woman will participate in the labour force.  
 
2.2. Women’s participation in India 
There has been little research on female labour force participation in India, especially 
concerning the recent changes, but it is generally known that the participation rate is 
low  compared  to  other  countries.  In  1998  India’s  Central  Statistical  Organization 
conducted  a  time  use  survey  in  six  states,  for  which  household  duties  (household 
maintenance and care for children, old, and sick household members) were classified as 
“extended-SNA” activities. The survey showed that urban women spent about 9 hours 
per week on SNA activities plus 36 hours on extended-SNA activities, against three 
plus 41 hours weekly, respectively, for men (NCEUS, 2007). Mitra (2005) names this 
dual burden of conventional productive work and household duties as one of the major 
constraints  to  women’s  labour  market  choice:  male  household  members  typically 
decide on the location of residence, and women depend on informal networks to find 
paid employment in the vicinity of their homes. 
Besides  the  double burden  of  work,  social  norms restrict  women’s  availability  and 
location of work such that their labour force participation is low (NCEUS, 2007). This 
may be reflected in the clear U-shaped relationship between women’s education and 
labour force participation in India. Kingdon and Unni (2001) attribute the downward 
sloping  part  of  this  U  to  the  process  of  Sanskritization:  social  restrictions  on  the 
lifestyles of women tend to become more rigid as households move up in the caste 
hierarchy (Chen and Drèze, 1992), though this portion can also be related to rising 
incomes of  husbands. Increasing participation  at the  highest education  levels  could 
reflect modernising influences that increase women’s aspirations, combined with higher 
returns to education that increase economic incentives for women to work. Bardhan 
(1986) argues that class, patriarchy, and social hierarchy (caste, ethnicity, and religion) 
all interact to shape attitudes towards gender roles. In that sense, the downward sloping 
part of the U reflects not just Sanskritization, but a general aspiration to upgrade social 
status or imitate lifestyles of higher status groups. Among higher classes, aspired status 
groups would be the urban educated, who have more Western lifestyles, associated with 
higher female labour force participation rates.  
Analysing regional differences in female participation rates in the 1990s, Ahasan and 
Pages (2008) find that employment opportunities play an important role especially in   8
rural  India, as  female  wages or expected earnings  have  a  strong  positive effect  on 
participation.  They  also  find  some  evidence  for  a negative  income effect of men’s 
earnings. Besides these classical income and substitution effects, however, the impact 
of cultural and social factors is not considered in their analysis. Based on a survey 
among 447 households in Delhi in 2006, Sudarshan and Bhattacharya (2009) find that 
besides  women’s  household workload,  lack  of  information and mobility  and safety 
concerns are important constraints to her participation. The decision to work is mainly 
determined by the external environment (e.g., child care arrangements and safety in 
public  spaces)  and  ideology  of  the  marital  household,  rather  than  the  woman’s 
individual attributes. 
Regarding the recent increase in participation rates, there is some evidence for rural 
India that women’s labour market entry between 1999 and 2004 was distress-driven: 
self-employment  increased  most  among  the  poorest  households,  real  wage  growth 
stagnated, and the workforce feminization was greatest in the farm sector in districts 
with  agricultural  distress  (Abraham,  2009).  The  story  for urban  India  may  be  less 
gloomy, as job opportunities are likely to be quite different: especially services sector 
employment is concentrated in urban India.  The next section gives a more detailed 
description of changes in the Indian urban labour market over the past decades. 
 
3. Women’s employment and earnings in urban India 
Data on employment and earnings used in this paper are from the four most recent 
‘thick’  rounds  of  the  National  Sample  Survey  (NSS)  on  Employment  and 
Unemployment,  the  official  source  of  employment  and  earnings  data  used  by  the 




Figure 1  shows  the  labour  force participation  rate  of  women  at different  education 
levels,  throughout  the  period  1987-2004.  It  shows  the  clear  U-shape  of  female 
participation by educational levels which is visible in each of the years; the low point is 
always among those with middle educational achievement. As far as time trends are 
                                                 
4 All figures in this paper are based on principal usual status activities. Usual status is based on a 
reference period of one year, in which principal activity is the activity in which the respondent spent the 
majority of time. Subsidiary activity is not taken into account in the present paper, as it affects less than 
five percent of the adult urban female population, and comparability over time is questionable: before the 
2004-05 survey, there was no lower bound on the number of hours spent on a particular activity to be 
considered as subsidiary activity, but in 2004-05 the minimum was set at 30 days of the reference year.    9
concerned, between 1987 and 1999 the urban female labour force participation rate 
increased somewhat for women below secondary education, while participation among 
highly educated women declined. In the period 1999-2004, participation rates increased 
substantially  at  all  educational  levels.  Further  inspection  of  the  data  (not  shown) 
indicates that participation rates in this last period increased most for the age group 20 
to 44, while there was relatively little change among older women. 
 












primary middle secondary graduate
1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05  
Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey 
 
One  needs  to  note  that  the  population  shares  of  the  different  educational  groups 
changed considerably, which, given different levels of participation among the groups, 
could partly account for the overall trends reported in Table 1. Between 1987 and 2004, 
the share of illiterate women declined from 42 to 27 per cent, while the share of women 
with secondary or graduate level education increased from 15 to 23 per cent and from 8 
to  15  per  cent,  respectively.  The  population  shares  of  the  other  groups  changed 
relatively little. Since there was, on aggregate, a shift from one high-participation group 
(illiterate)  to  two  other  high-participation  groups  (secondary  and  graduate),  these 
population shifts hardly affected the overall female participation rate. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of women with low and high education across different 
types  of  work  and  industries.  One  notes  that  below  secondary  education,  female 
employment is distributed widely across sectors and type of employment (regular and 
casual);  for  highly  educated  women,  the  vast  majority  is  employed  as  regular   10
employees  in  the  service  sector.  Also  noticeable  is  a  high  share  of  women  self-
employed  across  all  sectors,  suggesting  considerable  informal  sector  activities 
(including home-based work) of these urban women.   
 
Table 2 - Urban female population (age 20-59) 
Below secondary education  1987-88  1993-94  1999-00  2004-05 
Agriculture  Self-employed  870 (2.5)  876 (2.2)   744 (1.7)  1265 (2.5) 
  Regular  35 (0.1)  37 (0.1)  56 (0.1)  73 (0.1) 
  Casual  861 (2.5)  1173 (2.9)  1124 (2.6)  1080 (2.1) 
Manufacturing  Self-employed  1024 (3.0)  1137 (2.9)  1383 (3.1)  2004 (4.0) 
  Regular  362 (1.1)  312 (0.8)  517 (1.2)  641 (1.3) 
  Casual  508 (1.5)  570 (1.4)  316 (0.7)  430 (0.9) 
Other industry   Self-employed  12 (0.0)  16 (0.0)  11 (0.0)  11 (0.0) 
  Regular  58 (0.2)  58 (0.1)  51 (0.1)  48 (0.1) 
  Casual  393 (1.2)  567 (1.4)  683 (1.6  757 (1.5) 
Services  Self-employed  1046 (3.1)  1388 (3.5)  1802 (4.1)  1896 (3.8) 
  Regular  1054 (3.1)  1274 (3.2)  1432 (3.3)  2450 (4.9) 
  Casual  431 (1.3)  617 (1.5)  760 (1.7)  620 (1.2) 
Total workforce  6654(19.4)  8023(20.1)  8879(20.2)  11273(22.4) 
Unemployed    285  (0.8)  207  (0.5)  158  (0.4)  362  (0.7) 
Other    27364(79.8)  31612(79.4)  34926(79.4)  38672(76.9) 
Total (20-59)    34304(100)  39838(100)  43965(100)  50308(100) 
 
Secondary education or higher  1987-88  1993-94  1999-00  2004-05 
Agriculture  Self-employed  25  (0.3)  32  (0.2)  21  (0.1)  78  (0.3) 
  Regular  2  (0.0)  1  (0.0)  3  (0.0)  5  (0.0) 
  Casual  5  (0.0)  14  (0.1)  12  (0.1)  12  (0.0) 
Manufacturing  Self-employed  98  (1.0)  111  (0.7)  168  (0.7)  437  (1.5) 
  Regular  138  (1.4)  203  (1.3)  263  (1.1)  410  (1.4) 
  Casual  4  (0.0)  22  (0.1)  27  (0.1)  29  (0.1) 
Other industry  Self-employed  5  (0.1)  6  (0.0)  9  (0.0)  14  (0.0) 
  Regular  29  (0.3)  41  (0.3)  35  (0.1)  74  (0.2) 
  Casual  6  (0.1)  5  (0.0)  12  (0.1)  3  (0.0) 
Services  Self-employed  154  (1.5)  363  (2.3)  609  (2.6)  971  (3.3) 
  Regular  1654(16.5)  2361(14.8)  3008(12.9)  3952(13.3) 
  Casual  9  (0.1)  13  (0.1)  36  (0.2)  24  (0.1) 
Total workforce  2130(21.3)  3173(19.9)  4201(18.0)  6009(20.2) 
Unemployed    498(5.0)  769(4.8)  754(3.2)  1364(4.6) 
Other    7392 (73.8)  11984(75.2)  18381(78.8)  22349(75.2) 
Total    10020(100)  15928 (100)  23335 (100)  29724(100) 
Note: Numbers are in thousands, the percentage of total is given in parentheses. Agriculture includes 
forestry  and  fishing.  Other  industry  includes  mining,  construction,  and  utilities.  Self-employment 
includes  own  account  workers,  home  workers,  employers,  and  unpaid  family  workers.  Regular 
employees receive salary or wages on a regular basis. Casual workers receive a wage according to the 
terms of the daily or periodic work contract.  “Other” includes all non-labour force and a small number of 
women who work but do not report their industry.  
 
Below secondary education level, the participation rate was roughly constant prior to 
1999, but employment did shift from agriculture and manufacturing to the  services 
sector.  After  1999  the  participation  rate  increased  and  the  growing  importance  of   11
services continued, but there was also a slight increase in agriculture’s share and a rise 
in the share of manufacturing from 5 to 6.2 per cent. The participation rate among 
women with secondary or higher education declined between 1987 and 1999, when 
especially the share of women active in the services sector declined. Between 1999 and 
2004  the  share  of  services  increased  again,  while  manufacturing  became  more 
important as well. 
The  most  recent  two  NSS  surveys,  in  1999-2000  and  2004-05,  include  details  on 
workers’ enterprise type and location, union presence and membership, and whether a 
person’s  employment  is  of  permanent  or  temporary  nature.  Interestingly,  self-
employment  is  considered permanent,  while  regular  employment  is  increasingly  of 
temporary nature and union presence and membership decline. These data support the 
view that women’s employment opportunities did not improve since the turn of the 
century. 
A  closer  look  at  the  growth  of  female  employment  in  manufacturing  and  services 
reveals some interesting patterns. First of all, the rising share of both lowly and highly 
educated  women  in  manufacturing  after  1999  is  driven  by  an  increase  in  self-
employment in this sector, which is very much concentrated in the wearing apparel 
industry. According to a study of the industry in Tiruppur, a city in South India, and in 
Delhi, the boom in garment exports in the 1990s attracted many women, who remain 
concentrated in the lowest paying activities and occupy a highly invisible part of the 
value chain. Home-based workers are paid a piece-rate and constitute an  important 
buffer for demand fluctuations, thus facing huge income variations (Singh and Sapra, 
2007). This description of workforce informalization is in line with Standing (1999), 
who argues it pushes rather than pulls women into the labour force. 
Among the lowly educated women with regular employment in the services sector, the 
share working in private households (maids, cooks, babysitters, etc.) increased from 44 
to 62 per cent between 1999 and 2004. That is, almost one million women joined the 
labour force as domestic servants, which is a group of legally and socially vulnerable 
workers,  as  they  are  not  covered  by  existing  legislation  and  are  easy  victims  of 
exploitations  due  to  their  invisibility,  lack  of  education  and,  often,  migration 
background (Ramirez-Machado, 2003; NCEUS, 2007). 
Among  the  highly  educated  women  in  the  services  sector,  the  share  in  public 
administration declined from 16 to 11 per cent during 1999-2004, while the share of 
both domestic servants and software consultants increased from less than half percent   12
to  over  two  per  cent  each.  Among  the  highly  educated  self-employed  women  in 
services, the share in retail declined from 31 to 18 per cent, while the largest increases 
were in ‘adult and other education’ (15 to 20 per cent) and ‘other services’ (7 to 11 per 
cent).  
All in all, the picture looks different for lowly versus highly educated women. The 
latter seem to have reasonable employment opportunities, mainly in private and public 
services, while the former increasingly work as domestic servants and home workers in 
the  garments  industries,  and  thereby  constitute  a  very  vulnerable  group  with  low 
earnings and little security. 
 
3.2. Earnings 
One shortcoming of the NSS data is the fact that it does not record earnings data for 
self-employed workers. The average weekly earnings reported here are therefore based 
on employees only.
5 Figure 2 shows women’s real weekly earnings by education level 
for the four survey years. Real weekly earnings increased in the period 1993-1999 but 
stagnated  or  even  declined  afterwards,  except  for  workers  with  graduate  or  higher 
education. The level of earnings is substantially higher for men (not shown), but the 
pattern of change is similar.  
 
















Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey 
 
How is this picture of real wage changes reconcilable with the rosy picture of India’s 
economic growth? Several studies have indicated that India’s current growth pattern, 
                                                 
5 Earnings are spatially deflated and in 1987-88 Rupees, based on the Labour Bureau Consumer Price 
Index for Industrial Workers and Deaton (2003). No adjustment is made for hours worked.   13
dominated  by  skill-intensive  services  and  lacking  growth  in  low-skilled  intensive 
manufacturing, does not generate employment  for the large low-skilled labour force 
(Bosworth et al., 2007; Krueger, 2007; Pieters, 2010). Informalization of the workforce 
may  make  it  easier  for  low-skilled  population  to  find  remunerative  work, but  also 
means that job security is extremely poor and wages are low and volatile. This is in 
stark contrast with the fast-rising wages for high-skilled workers in the services sector 
(see, e.g., Kijima, 2006). A much telling illustration is given in Figure 3, showing real 
weekly  earnings  of  regular  employees  in  business  services,  domestic  servants,  and 
casual workers in the garments industry. Since 1993-94, the gap between the first and 
the two latter groups has widened enormously. 
As  the  education  level  of  women  and  their  spouses are  correlated,  lowly  educated 
women face a double impact of declining real wages: the decline in unearned income 
works as a ‘push-factor’, inducing her to work, while the decline in her own market 
wage reduces her incentive to work. With rising participation rates, it seems that push-
factors dominate the decision of lowly educated women to work.  
 








1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05
business services (regular) domestic servants garments (casual)  
Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey 
 
On the other hand, more attractive employment opportunities exist for highly educated 
women, who face higher market wages and are less likely to face declining unearned 
income. All in all, it is unlikely that rising participation in both groups is reflecting the 
same underlying process. 
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4. Empirical model and estimation results 
In light of the employment structure and changes in real earnings for different levels of 
education  and  in  different  industries,  the  main  question  is  whether  participation  of 
women is induced by negative income effects and some sort of insurance mechanism to 
cope  with  increasing  insecurity  in  the  labour  market.  We  hypothesize  that  lowly 
educated  women’s  participation  is  indeed  driven  by  such  factors,  whereas  highly 
educated  women  respond  more  to opportunities  reflected  in  market  wages  and  the 
availability of attractive jobs. 
 
4.1. Women’s participation probability 
We analyse women’s participation decision at the individual level, based on a sample 
of urban women age 20 to 44, excluding women who are enrolled in education or 
unable to work due to disability, and women who are head of their household. Self-
employed  women are dropped  from the  sample  due to the  non-availability of  self-
employment  earnings  data:  the  expected  market  wage  can  only  be  estimated  for 
employees.
6 
We estimate the probability of woman i in year t being employed using a binary probit 
model, which is estimated separately for each year and for women below secondary 
education and women with secondary or higher education. 
        it t it t rt it Z w F p       ˆ ln ,        (1) 
where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The model includes a 
region  fixed  effect  αrt,  which  controls  for  region  level  unobservable  participation 
determinants, the log expected market wage  it w ˆ ln , and a vector Zit consisting of: 
-  Unearned income per capita (other household members’ real weekly earnings, 
divided by household size) 
-  Employment  and  income  security  (the  number of other  household  members 
working as a regular employee) 
-  Underemployment of male adult household members 
-  Marital status 
-  The number of children in the household 
-  Social group (whether a person belongs to a scheduled caste or tribe, SCST) 
                                                 
6 Clearly, some valuable information is lost by excluding this segment of the labour market, but 
fortunately the changes in paid employment participation are very similar to the overall female labour 
force participation changes.   15
-  Religion  
-  Education level of the household head 
The  expected  market  wage  is  predicted  for  all  women  in  the  sample,  based  on  a 
standard wage equation with Heckman selection bias correction (Heckman, 1979). Real 
weekly earnings are regressed on age, its square, and education level: 
  it it t jit jt it t it t t it u b Edu b Age b Age b b W        4 3
2
2 1 0 ln ,       (2) 
where Wi is real weekly earnings, Eduji is a vector of dummy variables for education 
level, and i is the inverse Mills ratio. The latter is obtained from a probit model for 
participation, equal to equation (1), except that the expected market wage is replaced by 
its determinants: 
    it t it t it t it t rt it Z c Edu b Age b Age b a F p      3
2
2 1 .      (3) 
The  wage  model  is  identified  on  the  vector  Zit,  which  affects  the  probability  of 
participation but has no effect on earnings. Estimation results for equation (2) are given 
in Appendix table A.1.  
To measure unearned income, the earnings of self-employed household members are 
imputed based on  the  earnings of  employees.  It appears  this  imputation  serves  the 
purpose of measuring unearned income per capita, as the results are very similar when 
households with one or more self-employed adults are excluded from the samples. In 
the  final  estimation  we  rely  on  the  imputed  earnings  in  order  to  retain  as  many 
observations as possible. 
As  a  proxy  for  employment  and  income  security  we  include  the  number  of  other 
household members with regular employment (Nreg), with categories zero, one, and 
two or more. This is based on the notion that regular employment provides more stable 
and secure income than other types of work. Additionally, in the surveys for 1999-2000 
and 2004-05, working persons report for how many months during the reference year 
they were without work. This is used to measure underemployment, as an indicator 
variable which is equal to one if at least one working male household member reports 
one or more months without work.
7 
Marital status and the number of children are included to capture family obligations 
which are likely to negatively affect female labour force participation. Social group and 
religion are proxies for attitudes towards women’s work. Members of a scheduled caste 
or tribe (SCST) are expected to be more likely to work, as these are the lowest social 
                                                 
7 Data on this subject in 1987-88 are not comparable with the more recent survey rounds.   16
classes in India, in which there is no economic room to withdraw women from the 
labour force and to emulate higher classes (Bardhan, 1986). Religiosity in general has 
been related to more traditional views of women’s role (Jaeger, 2010; Seguino, 2011), 
but previous studies have found that Muslim women in India have lower participation 
rates than women of other religions (Das and Desai, 2003). Finally, we control for 
household head’s education, which could capture social effects, but also proxies for 
household wealth (in addition to unearned income, which includes only current weekly 
earnings of other household members).  
 
Table 3 – Average values, low education sample 
  1987-88    1999-00    2004-05 
   mean  st.dev.     mean  st.dev.     mean  st.dev. 
Employee  0.09  0.29    0.10  0.30    0.13  0.33 
ln(wage)  3.69  0.17    4.07  0.12    4.04  0.10 
ln(y_unearned)  3.45  0.99    3.69  1.06    3.64  1.02 
Nreg 0  0.52  0.50    0.58  0.49    0.60  0.49 
Nreg 1  0.38  0.49    0.34  0.47    0.31  0.46 
Nreg >1  0.10  0.30    0.08  0.27    0.08  0.28 
Underemployment        0.16  0.37    0.19  0.39 
Age  30.07  6.83    31.11  6.78    31.20  6.88 
Illiterate    0.48  0.50    0.43  0.49    0.40  0.49 
Literate below prim.  0.13  0.34    0.12  0.33    0.13  0.33 
Primary school  0.21  0.41    0.19  0.39    0.20  0.40 
Middle school  0.18  0.38    0.26  0.44    0.27  0.44 
Married  0.92  0.27    0.92  0.27    0.92  0.28 
Children 0-4  0.85  1.00    0.69  0.95    0.68  0.94 
Children 5-14  1.57  1.42    1.51  1.44    1.40  1.37 
SCST  0.17  0.38    0.22  0.42    0.24  0.43 
Hindu  0.74  0.44    0.73  0.44    0.75  0.43 
Muslim  0.21  0.40    0.22  0.41    0.20  0.40 
Christian  0.02  0.13    0.02  0.13    0.02  0.13 
Other religion  0.03  0.18    0.03  0.18    0.03  0.17 
Illiterate hh    0.26  0.44    0.28  0.45    0.28  0.45 
Literate hh  0.16  0.36    0.14  0.35    0.15  0.35 
Primary hh  0.20  0.40    0.15  0.36    0.18  0.38 
Middle hh  0.16  0.37    0.19  0.39    0.19  0.39 
Secondary hh  0.17  0.37    0.20  0.40    0.17  0.37 
Graduate hh  0.05  0.22    0.05  0.21    0.04  0.19 
N  22222        19391        17801    
Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey. 
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Table 4 – Average values, high education sample 
  1987-88    1999-00    2004-05 
  mean  st.dev.     mean  st.dev.     mean  st.dev. 
Employee  0.19  0.39    0.14  0.35    0.16  0.37 
ln(wage)  5.13  0.41    5.22  0.44    5.15  0.48 
ln(y_unearned)  4.21  1.11    4.38  1.23    4.39  1.20 
Nreg 0  0.34  0.47    0.44  0.50    0.46  0.50 
Nreg 1  0.50  0.50    0.45  0.50    0.43  0.50 
Nreg >1  0.16  0.36    0.11  0.31    0.10  0.30 
Underemployment        0.06  0.24    0.06  0.24 
Age  29.62  6.47    30.53  6.62    30.50  6.64 
Secondary school  0.64  0.48    0.63  0.48    0.64  0.48 
Graduate or higher  0.36  0.48    0.37  0.48    0.36  0.48 
Married  0.85  0.36    0.87  0.34    0.86  0.34 
Children 0-4  0.64  0.87    0.54  0.80    0.58  0.80 
Children 5-14  1.08  1.20    1.03  1.19    0.97  1.11 
SCST  0.04  0.20    0.07  0.26    0.09  0.29 
Hindu  0.82  0.38    0.81  0.39    0.81  0.39 
Muslim  0.07  0.25    0.09  0.29    0.09  0.29 
Christian  0.04  0.19    0.04  0.18    0.03  0.17 
Other religion  0.07  0.26    0.06  0.24    0.07  0.25 
Below secondary hh  0.25  0.44    0.24  0.43    0.28  0.45 
Secondary hh  0.37  0.48    0.38  0.48    0.39  0.49 
Graduate hh  0.37  0.48    0.38  0.48    0.32  0.47 
N  8329    12261        9884    
Source: NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the data for the final samples, which include only regular 
and  casual  employees  and  women  out  of  the  labour  force.
8  In  both  samples,  the 
predicted market wage (that is, the fitted value based on equation 2) is lower in 2004-05 
than  in  1999-000.  In  the  low education sample there  is  also a decline  in  unearned 
income and an increase in underemployment, while these variables are constant during 
the last period in the high education sample. An increasing share of women has no 
other household member with regular employment. 
Educational attainment is increasing in the low education sample, but stable over time 
within  the  high  education  sample.  Interestingly,  we  see  that  the  education  of  the 
household head declines between 1999-00 and 2004-05 among the  highly educated 
women: a sign of progress in women’s educational attainment relative to men’s. 
                                                 
8 Unemployed women are excluded, but results are very similar when included in the sample. In India, as 
in other developing countries, the difference between unemployed (who are in the labor force) and non-
workers (who are out of the labor force) bears little empirical relevance.    18
The number of children per household declines over time and is, in each year, lower 
among highly education women (though the difference is not statistically significant). 
Scheduled castes and tribes (SCST) and Muslims are relatively overrepresented in the 
low  education  sample,  and  while  the  SCST  share  rises  over  time,  the  religious 
composition of both samples has hardly changed. 
 
4.2. Estimation results 
Tables 5 shows the average estimated marginal effects for the low and high education 
samples,  indicating  the  change  in  the  probability  of  being  employed  due  to  a  unit 
change in the explanatory variable. Corresponding probit coefficient estimates can be 
found in Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3.  
The most important result is the marginal effect of the predicted market wage: it is 
negative  for  lowly  educated  women  and  positive  for  the  highly  educated.  When 
interpreting the wage effect, one should note that education may not only determine a 
woman’s expected market wage, but also her reservation wage. As discussed earlier in 
this paper, there is a clear U-shaped relationship between education and female labour 
force  participation,  which  reaches  its  bottom  at  the  middle  school  level.  While 
education raises the expected market wage, it is likely to raise the reservation wage in 
the low-education sample, reflecting changing attitudes towards women’s work as the 
status or wealth of households increases (the Sanskritization effect). The market wage 
and reservation wage effects of education are not separately identifiable, but the latter 
rising faster than the former can explain the negative wage effect for women with less 
than secondary education.
9 The positive wage effect in the high education sample is a 
clear  sign  that,  once  women  have  at  least  secondary  education,  higher  earnings 
potential increases the probability of participation. This effect is declining over time, 
however,  indicating  that  expected  earnings  have  become  less  important  as  a 
determinant of labour force participation. 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Blau and Kahn (2007) for a discussion of the own wage effect on hours of labor when own 
education level is not controlled for separately.   19
Table 5 – Probit average marginal effects 
Pr(employee)  Below secondary education    Secondary or higher education 
   1987-88  1999-00  2004-05    1987-88  1999-00  2004-05 
ln(wage)  -0.06***  -0.20***  -0.20***    0.27***  0.21***  0.17*** 
  [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.04]    [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
ln(y_unearned)  -0.03***  -0.02***  -0.04***    -0.03***  -0.02***  -0.03*** 
  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]    [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
Nreg 1  0.01  0  0.01    0.11***  0.09***  0.08*** 
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]    [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Nreg >1  0.04***  0.03***  0.05***    0.15***  0.13***  0.13*** 
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]    [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.01] 
Underemployed    0.03***  0.03***      0.04**  0.00 
    [0.01]  [0.01]      [0.02]  [0.01] 
Married  -0.06***  -0.07***  -0.10***    -0.22***  -0.20***  -0.23*** 
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]    [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Children0-4  -0.02***  -0.03***  -0.04***    -0.03***  -0.01*  -0.03*** 
  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.01]    [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.01] 
Children 5-14  -0.00*  0  0.01*    -0.03***  -0.02***  -0.01** 
  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00]    [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
SCST  0.07***  0.06***  0.05***    0.05  0.05***  0.04* 
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]    [0.03]  [0.01]  [0.02] 
Muslim  -0.04***  -0.08***  -0.10***    -0.03  -0.01  -0.04** 
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]    [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.01] 
Christian  0.04**  0  -0.01    0.12***  0.07*  0.09* 
  [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.02]    [0.04]  [0.03]  [0.04] 
Other non-
Hindu  -0.01  -0.04**  -0.03 
 
-0.04*  -0.01  -0.01 
  [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.02]    [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.03] 
Illiterate hh  0.12***  0.11***  0.11***         
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]         
Literate hh  0.06***  0.06***  0.06***         
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]         
Primary hh  0.05***  0.05***  0.06***         
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]         
Middle hh  0.03***  0.03***  0.04***    -0.01  0.01  0.02* 
  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]    [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Secondary hh  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.    Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Graduate hh  0.04**  0.04*  0.03    -0.01  0.01  0.03*** 
  [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.02]    [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
N  22222  19391  17801    8329  12261  9884 
Pseudo R-sq  0.22  0.22  0.21    0.2  0.19  0.23 
Note: In the high education sample, the category Middle for household head education includes all levels 
below secondary education. Region dummies are included in the estimation. Standard errors between 
brackets, significance levels: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Marginal effects are calculated using Stata’s -
margins- command. 
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As expected, unearned income reduces women’s participation. Its effect is the same in 
both samples, though one would expect it to be stronger in the low-education sample, 
where the average level of income is lower. A plausible explanation for these results is 
that  unearned  income  measures  only  weekly  earnings,  and  the  more  permanent 
component of household income (including wealth) is captured by the household head’s 
education level.  Head’s education has a negative effect on participation in the low-
education sample, at least up to secondary education. Graduate or higher education of 
the household head increases the probability of participation again. Our results thus 
confirm the importance of households’ economic and social status as determinants of 
women’s  labour  force  participation,  and  are  in  line  with  the  U-shape  and 
Sanskritization process (Chen and Drèze, 1992; Kingdon and Unni, 2001). 
The  presence, in the  household,  of other regular  employees  increases  participation, 
especially among highly educated women. This contrasts with the idea that women are 
less likely to work if their unearned income is more secure. A possible explanation is 
that  regular  employment  of  household  members  provides  the  necessary  network  or 
information  for  women  to  find  work.  It  could  also  reduce  entry  barriers  to  paid 
employment through  familiarity  with  employers, reducing families’ safety  concerns 
(Sudarshan and Bhattacharya, 2009). Moreover, as discussed in Section 3.1, regular 
employment has become of more temporary nature between the last two survey rounds 
and may thus be a poor measure of employment security.
10 Underemployment of male 
household  members,  an  alternative  proxy  for  employment  insecurity  facing  the 
household, does increase the probability of women’s participation: for a given level of 
unearned income, if a male household member is without work for at least one month 
of the year, a woman is three to four percentage points more likely to work. The effect 
disappears, however, in the last year in the high education sample. 
Turning  to  household  composition  variables,  unmarried  women  are  more  likely  to 
work,  especially  among  highly  educated  women.  Having  young  children  reduces 
participation in both samples, while older children only reduce participation in the high-
education sample: possibly, only highly educated women can afford to stay at home 
with older children, but the effect of older children is declining over time.  
Women belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Tribe are more likely to work for pay. 
Religion matters  in both samples, but to different degrees. Muslim women are less 
                                                 
10 The nature of employment (temporary or permanent) is recorded only in the 1999-00 and 2004-05 
survey rounds.   21
likely to work, which is in line with previous studies (e.g., Das and Desai, 2003) but we 
clearly see that education mitigates the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim 
women. Christian women are more likely to work only among the  highly  educated 
women.  
All in all, both groups of women respond to unearned income and underemployment of 
household members, and these effects are not substantially different between lowly and 
highly educated women. The marginal effect of the expected market wage, however, is 
a clear sign that highly educated women are drawn into the labour force by higher 
wages, whereas lowly educated women are not. Furthermore,  the education level of the 
household  head  has  a  strong  impact  among  the  lowly  educated  women:  their 
participation probability declines with higher education of the household head, up to 
secondary schooling. Women in graduate-headed households are again more likely to 
work.  The  importance  of  household  wealth  and  status  for  female  labour  force 
participation is thus confirmed by our results. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
While India’s economy has grown at increasingly faster rates over the past decades, the 
female  labour force participation rate  has  increased  only since  the  start of the 21
st 
century,  when  at  all  levels  of  education  the  share  of  women  in  the  labour  force 
increased. This paper examines trends and drivers of female labour force participation 
in urban India between 1987 and 2004, paying special attention to differences between 
lowly and highly educated women. 
Changes in the structure of employment and real earnings in urban India suggest that 
women’s  increased  participation  was  driven  by  necessity  rather  than  improved 
opportunities, at least for women with less than secondary schooling. After 1999, the 
share of lowly educated women working as domestic servant and in agriculture and 
manufacturing  self-employment  increased,  the  latter  concentrated  in  the  garments 
industry.  Domestic  servants  and  home  workers  in the garments  industry  have  been 
characterized  by  their  invisibility,  vulnerability,  and  meagre  and  highly  volatile 
earnings (NCEUS, 2007; Singh and Sapra, 2007). Coinciding with substantial growth 
in these types of employment, workers with less than secondary education, both male 
and female, experienced a decline in their real earnings. And at all education levels, a 
shift  from  regular  employment  to  self-employment  took  place,  while  regular 
employment itself became of more temporary and informal nature.   22
For the lowly educated urban population, therefore, the labour market developments are 
in line with the view of Standing (1999), who argues that rising female labour force 
participation reflects the erosion of men’s position in the labour market, rather than an 
improvement in women’s opportunities: workers face more insecurity as the economy 
liberalizes and becomes more globally integrated. 
Real earnings of highly educated men and women did still rise after 1999, though at a 
slower  rate  than  before.  Among  highly  educated  women,  self-employment  in 
manufacturing  and  services  became  more  important,  but  regular  employment  in 
services increased as well. These women appear to have access to more attractive jobs 
in terms of visibility, security, and earnings. Given India’s structure of growth, which is 
in large part driven by skill-intensive services, it should hardly be surprising to find that 
rising  participation  in  the  low-  and  high-education  groups  is  reflecting  different 
underlying processes. 
To further analyse the determinants of women’s participation in paid employment, we 
estimate  a  probit  model  using  individual  data  from  the  NSS  Employment  and 
Unemployment  Survey  of  1987-88,  1999-2000,  and  2004-05.  We  find  that  highly 
educated women are drawn into the labour force by higher wages, whereas the expected 
market wage negatively affects participation of lowly educated women, which is the 
main difference between the two groups. For both groups, lower unearned income and 
underemployment of male household members increase the probability of participation. 
Our analysis also confirms the importance of social and cultural factors, in line with 
previous studies (Mammen and Paxson, 2000; Kingdon and Unni, 2001; Sudarshan and 
Bhattacharya, 2009). 
All  in  all,  our  analysis  indicates  that  the  impressive  economic  performance  of  the 
Indian economy is, if anything, only creating attractive labour market opportunities for 
highly  educated  women.  The  labour  market  for  lowly  educated  women  (and  men) 
appears  to  have  become  more  insecure,  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  increased 
participation among them is a positive reflection of India’s fast economic growth. It 
always remains debatable whether increased participation in low-paying and informal 
jobs  should  be  seen  as  improvements  compared  to  non-participation.  For  whatever 
reason women decide to work, it does allow them to contribute to household income. 
One could surely also argue that home workers in the garments industry, for example, 
contribute to India’s economic success. As Bhalotra and Umaña-Aponte (2010) argue,   23
however, distress-driven participation in a highly flexible labour market is unlikely to 
contribute to women’s emancipation.  
If attractive employment opportunities and “modern” attitudes towards women’s work 
are confined to the highly educated population, women’s labour force participation may 
contribute substantially to household inequality in India. Several studies have shown 
that  returns to education are  high  and  increasing, resulting  in  ever  higher earnings 
inequality  (Chamarbagwala,  2006;  Kijima,  2006).  Spouses’  education  levels  are 
positively correlated, so while participation and earnings of women at the bottom of the 
education  (and  earnings) distribution may  mitigate the  inequality  in male  earnings, 
rising participation at the top will only aggravate it.   24
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1 – Wage equation, estimation results 
  Below secondary education    Secondary or higher education 
lnW  1987-88  1999-00  2004-05    1987-88  1999-00  2004-05 
Age  -0.005  -0.002  0.006    0.240***  0.182***  0.086* 
  [0.026]  [0.026]  [0.021]    [0.027]  [0.032]  [0.034] 
Age sq.  0.000  0.000  0.000    -0.003***  -0.002***  -0.001 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]    [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Illiterate  Ref.             
Literate  0.099  0.138*  0.117**         
  [0.057]  [0.055]  [0.044]         
Primary  0.106  0.148**  0.101*         
  [0.055]  [0.051]  [0.041]         
Middle  0.395***  0.256***  0.194***         
  [0.069]  [0.052]  [0.041]         
Secondary          Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Graduate          0.505***  0.530***  0.646*** 
          [0.040]  [0.049]  [0.051] 
Constant  3.428***  3.841***  3.694***    0.742  1.494**  2.787*** 
  [0.399]  [0.398]  [0.330]    [0.414]  [0.503]  [0.515] 
Lambda  0.187***  0.150***  0.113***    0.139**  0.165**  0.168*** 
  [0.039]  [0.036]  [0.030]    [0.044]  [0.051]  [0.049] 
N  1762  1721  2083     1492  1696  1522 
N total  22235  19704  17843    8404  12291  9929 
Note: Dependent variable is log real weekly earnings. Lambda is the sample selection bias correction 
term  (see  Heckman,  1979).  Standard  errors  are  in  brackets,  significance  levels:  *p<.10;  **p<.05; 
***p<.01 
   28
Table A.2 – Probit model coefficients, low education sample 
Pr(employee)  1987-88  1999-00  2004-05 
ln(w)  -0.440***  -1.404***  -1.183*** 
  [0.125]  [0.199]  [0.241]    
ln(y_unearned)  -0.215***  -0.171***  -0.225*** 
  [0.022]  [0.015]  [0.017]    
Nreg 1  0.06  -0.009  0.089 
  [0.052]  [0.049]  [0.047]    
Nreg >1  0.300***  0.179***  0.256*** 
  [0.071]  [0.051]  [0.072]    
Underemployed    0.173***  0.175*** 
    [0.044]  [0.030]    
Married  -0.477***  -0.527***  -0.595*** 
  [0.085]  [0.073]  [0.056]    
Children0-4  -0.162***  -0.240***  -0.229*** 
  [0.016]  [0.020]  [0.032]    
Children 5-14  -0.023*  -0.015  0.031*   
  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.014]    
SCST  0.474***  0.394***  0.293*** 
  [0.059]  [0.057]  [0.038]    
Muslim  -0.352***  -0.662***  -0.715*** 
  [0.061]  [0.072]  [0.069]    
Christian  0.229**  0.009  -0.035 
  [0.077]  [0.099]  [0.128]    
Other non-Hindu  -0.084  -0.319*  -0.151 
  [0.113]  [0.137]  [0.131]    
Illiterate hh  0.950***  0.812***  0.691*** 
  [0.088]  [0.047]  [0.063]    
Literate hh  0.590***  0.534***  0.407*** 
  [0.097]  [0.059]  [0.073]    
Primary hh  0.493***  0.442***  0.437*** 
  [0.079]  [0.059]  [0.068]    
Middle hh  0.321***  0.266***  0.302*** 
  [0.090]  [0.056]  [0.065]    
Secondary hh       
Graduate hh  0.482***  0.382**  0.207 
  [0.106]  [0.126]  [0.115]    
Constant  0.63  5.129***  4.484*** 
  [0.515]  [0.783]  [0.967]    
N  22222  19391  17801 
R-sq.   0.22  0.22   0.21 
Note:  Region  dummies  are  included  but  not  reported.  Region  cluster-robust  standard  errors  are 
reported in brackets. Significance levels: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.  
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Table A.3 – Probit model coefficients, high education sample 
Pr(employee)  1987-88  1999-00  2004-05 
ln(wage)  1.286***  1.123***  0.882*** 
  [0.074]  [0.049]  [0.050]    
ln(y_unearned)  -0.160***  -0.087***  -0.140*** 
  [0.016]  [0.017]  [0.020]    
Nreg 1  0.574***  0.496***  0.470*** 
  [0.056]  [0.039]  [0.041]    
Nreg >1  0.740***  0.680***  0.686*** 
  [0.076]  [0.073]  [0.064]    
Underemployed    0.202**  0.026 
    [0.077]  [0.065]    
Married  -1.021***  -1.075***  -1.224*** 
  [0.065]  [0.059]  [0.050]    
Children0-4  -0.139***  -0.066*  -0.136*** 
  [0.023]  [0.027]  [0.036]    
Children 5-14  -0.124***  -0.095***  -0.046**  
  [0.025]  [0.016]  [0.017]    
SCST  0.222  0.250***  0.189*   
  [0.116]  [0.059]  [0.078]    
Muslim  -0.15  -0.056  -0.242**  
  [0.103]  [0.090]  [0.087]    
Christian  0.479***  0.345*  0.425**  
  [0.128]  [0.138]  [0.149]    
Other non-Hindu  -0.222*  -0.067  -0.057 
  [0.103]  [0.084]  [0.173]    
Below secondary hh  -0.054  0.072  0.085*   
  [0.042]  [0.052]  [0.043]    
Secondary hh       
Graduate hh  -0.03  0.044  0.145*** 
  [0.041]  [0.041]  [0.044]    
Constant  -6.151***  -6.012***  -3.994*** 
  [0.353]  [0.254]  [0.294]    
N  8329  12261  9884 
 R-sq.   0.20  0.19  0.23  
Note:  Region  dummies  are  included  but  not  reported.  Region  cluster-robust  standard  errors  are 
reported in brackets. Significance levels: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01. 
 